Introduction and background
In the last three years there has been a rapid escalation in militant action by trade unions in Solomon Islands. In 1989 a lon. g-running dispute between the government and the Solomon Islands National Teachers' Association (SINTA) reached a head with a three month long national teachers' strike, one of the longest and largest stoppages in Solomon Islands labour history.. The teachers were pursuing a fight to bring their pay scale into alignment with the general public service pay scale. More recently there has been a bitter dispute between Solomon Mamaloni's government and the Solomon Islands Public Employees Union (SIPEU). It began in September, 1990 when the govenament changed the conditions of service for its Pet•••anent Secretaries, putting them on four year contracts, increasing their salaries by 118 percent, and offering a range of ẽxtra gratuities and benefits. The SIPEU reacted angrily, opposing the new contracts and demanding an equivalent increase in salary for the rest of the public service. Strike action took place in November 1990. A new and much longer strike started in Aprill991, after the government withdrew its recognition of the SIPEU claiming that the union had not fulfilled the requirements of its constitution. This strike, reponed to involve up to 4000 civil servants (Solomon Star, 31 May 1991), lasted nine weeks although not all stayed out over the whole period. Public servants got a 16 percent pay increase during the strike. The disagreement over recognition and the SIPEU's opposition to the new contracts for Permanent Secretaries continued for the rest of tl-.e year. In November, 1991, following repons that the government was in a serious financial crisis with foreign reserves at a record low level, thete was a call from the Solomon Islands Council of Trade 24 Ian Frazer Unions (SIcru) for Solomon Mamaloni's ~esignation from office accompanied by the threat of a large national strike! As these ev, ents suggest, Solomon Islands has a very strong and politically active union movement After Papua New Guinea and Fiji it is now the thin:l largest movement among independent countries of the South Pacific. The 18 registered unions claim to have a membership of 19,500 which is 75 percent of the enumerated workforce of 26,000.2 Within the union movement, the SIPEU, with an estimated 3000 members, and the SINT A, with 2500 members, are the second and third largest trade unions, coming some way behind the Solomon Islands National Union of Workers (SINUW) which at the end of 1990 claimed a paid-up membership of 11,000 representing around 50 percent of the total enumerated workfofte. 3 On the figures given, these tmee unions . account for 93 percent of unionised workers. All the other unions representing the remaining seven percent have less than 300 members. Most of them are made up of groups of employees, often professional or managerial staff, belonging to only one enterprise, government department or statutory authority. They include nurses, doctors, senior police officers, electricity workers, pilots, and prison officers.
The ~owth of unionism has taken place in a , country in which there has been limited development of wage em. ployment Solomon Islands continues to depend heavily on agriculture. The majority of people live in villages and practise mixed subsistence and commercial production. The main exports are timber, fish, palm oil, copra and cocoa. There is some small-scale manufacturing and proc· essing, mostly based in Honiara. The employment provided by all these industries with the commercial sector and a large public sector gives an enumerated workforce which is still only 18 percent of the working age population (15-54 years) (Central Bank of Solomon Islands, Annual R~pon, 1990) . This relatively small workforce is also highly mobile · with a lot of movement in and out of employment, and between different workplaces.
In view of the small size of the workforce and its mobility, proletarianisation has not been seen as a strong trend in the Solomon Islands and there has been little interest in the history of organised labour (Connell and Curtain, 1982; Connell, 1983 Report, 1990. 3 The SIPEU total is a conservative estimate. Acn1al membership was contested when the Government wilhdrew recognition in 1991. In one report SIPEU claims 4000 (Solomon Star, 31 May 1991) . The SINTA and SINUW figures were given by union officials. 4 Two recent histories of the Solomon Islands make little reference to trade Wlion history (see Bennen. 1987; Laracy, 1989) .
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Honiara (up to 60 percent of the enumerated wotkforce are employed on Nonh Guadalcanal), and in its stability.s · These trends are significant enough to represent the emergence of an urban-based working class. Some of the strongest evidence for this comes from the growth of organised labour, as seen in the history of collective action to improve wages and working conditions, including several large general strikes. Early unionism was weak and its future uncenain but by the 1980s this had changed and it had become a powerful industrial force.
In view of this, the idea that Solomon Islands still has a largely migratory labour force is drastically in need of revision.
The main aim of this paper, as a contribution to this revision, is to outline the history of Solomon Island unionism, giving attention in particular to the timing and fo1m of union organisation. The paper will finish by looking at contemporary unionism and relating this to emergent class foi•uation. The period being dealt with here only goes back as far as the frrst attempts at organisation in the 1950s and early 1960s. The history of labour relations prior to this has already been well documented (Benne~ 1987) . ' The combination of a very paternalistic and repressive colonial state, a plantation economy that relied on indentured labour migration, and a smaJI, uneducated, poorly skilled and ethnically divided workforce, ptccluded the fmcnation of workers' associations. Wages and other conditions of work were laid down by regulation and were not open to collective negotiation. Occasional protests and disputes took place on plantations and in other workplaces, and a very disruptive recruiting boycott was organised under the Maasina Rule movernent in the late 1940s (Frazer, 1990) , but it was not until the administration lifted its coercive labour policy in the fmal years of colonial rule that workers were allowed to fotm their own trade unions.
When unionism first began, the labour market that had existed until that time was being transfo1med under the influenc, e of British aid, which was then being used to raise the level of social and economic development in the territory. The policy that was pursued required a large and expanding state structure (Hughes, 1988, p.5 Hughes, 1988) .
Unionism has been snongly influenc, ed by the relative size of the public sector and by the heavy concentration of employment in Honiara. Government employees did not have a monopoly on organisation; private sector workers have also been prominent in the history of the movement. Gov, emment employees did have the advantage of being heavily concentrated in Honiara and dealing with an employer that wanted to set a good example in industrial relations. The government could not so easily avoid recognition and negotiation as private employers.
marks the occasion when expattiate civil servants left and foiiued their own organisation, and Solomon Islanders took over the Association. By this time they not only outnumbered expaaiates, they were impatient to speed up the process of localisation. The Pincombe review reaffumed the differences in their salaries and this was a continuing grievance. Under Solomon Islanders' conttol, the BSICSA was a much more active and outspoken organisation but its effectiveness suffered through the high turnover of the executive and their movement into politics or to the higher levels of the civil service (Frazer, 1986; Tuhanuku, 1984, pp.Sl-82) .
Organisation of workers outside the civil service began in the early 1960s, when the number of people in paid employment was not much above the levels reached in the plantation era. Except for the small number of skilled employees, the majority of workers were being paid and treated as bachelor migrants. The first trade union was fo1med among stevedores and copra woikers. It was registered in 1961 .and called the British Solomon Islands Workers Union (BSIWU). In 1963 it became the British Solomon Islands Ports and Copra Workers Union (BSIPCWU). In the same year another union was fotnled to represent unskilled and semi-skilled woikers in Honiara, the British Solomon Islands Building and General Workers Union (BSIBGWU). A strong group within that union were government non-established workers.
The short period in which these unions were active was a particularly turbulent tine for industrial relations. ' There were two general strikes in Honiara and a umd strike by workers of the largest private company in the Solomons, Levers Pacific Plantations Limited. The unrest was not brought about by the unions themselves but by the tactics used by govetnment and private employers to avoid serious collective bargaining. This soon ~ove a wedge between union leaders and the rank and file and effectively destroyed all credibility for unionism Both unions were ẽstablished with the advice and assistance of the Depat tment of Labour and its Commissioner of Labour. They remained under that influence even though they were well off financially and could afford to support their own full-time officials and a central office. This compromised them so badly it inhibited them from using strike action, the only real power that they had in their attempt to , gain recognition and pursue negotiations.
Mter registration, it was 18 months before the BSIWU negotiated two agreements with employers, one with the Ports Authority and the other with Levers. The long delay in getting an agxeement built up disaffection with the union. This got worse as the membership demanded a second round of negotiations. Levers, in particular, ignored these demands so in September, 1964, their workers took action into their own hands and struck. The strike spread to most of Levers' plantations, with 933 workers stopping work, some 80 percent of the company's labour force. It lasted ẽight days before it was broken and the majority returned to work. What helped Levers to break this strike was its policy of hiring a more compliant ethnic group (Tikopians) and using them to divide the labour force. Nothing was achieved by the strike. The union was then banned from LeveiS' , estates. It did negotiate another ag~eement with the Pons Authority on behalf of stevedores but by then had no support to keep going.
There was a similar experience with the BSffiGWU and its members working in town. Their confrontation arose with the government on behalf of its non-established workers. After delaying negotiations for eight months, there was a secret ag~eement with union leaders offering a wage increase considerably less than what was being demanded. When the membership found out they also struck, precipitating a general strike throughout Honiara. It started on 1 April 1965 and spread ' to other government workers in Yandina, Munda and l 28
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Giza. Around 1,500 workers struck and stayed out for eight days. The government broke the strike by threatening to sack the strikers and repatriate them to their homes . . An estimated 20 percent of strikers did not return to work. Nothing was gained through the strike and the union closed down soon afterwards. The 1965 general strike was the second major stoppage in Honiara in three years. An earlier general strike in 1962 was not union-lecl The leadership and the majority of strikers were government non-established wor~ers. They were protesting specifically about the discriminatory provisions in the Mayle A ward, a new wages and salary awan:i for all government employees which was released in October, 1962. The award gave expatriate civil servants a 20 percent increase, local civil servants 13 percent, and non-established workers 10 percent. All government non-established workers plus many others struck without warning at the end of the month. More than 1,100 workers struck and stayed out until they negotiated the same 20 percent increase as expatriate civil servants. Significantly, local civil servants did not join this strike under pressure from the government The early 1960s were an object lesson for aspiring union 1ẽaders that in years to come was heeded to good effect. In the meantime, the colonial state reinforced its power over organised labour by bringing in comprehensivẽ new legislation for the control of trade unions (The Trade Unions Ordinance No 4/1966).
The 1970s: the beginning of independent unionism It took ten years before unionism recovered from the events of 1964-65. The recovery, which was unexpected and unassisted, brought a completely new kind of unionism to the country. In particular it was politically driven and for a short period it threw the government and industrial relations into turmoil.
The years from 1966 to 1974 were relatively quiet for industrial relations. The~e were a number of small disputes confined to particular workplaces but none which led to wider strike action. Civil servants demonstrated over a pay claim in 1972 (British Solomon Islands, Ne~s Sheet, 16-30 November 1972) . There were sevẽral unsuccessful attempts to revive unionism including one by Pẽter Salaka, who represented Honiara in the Governing Council.
The Labour Depw tn1ent used this void to push joint consultation "'with varying degrees of success~~ (Solomon Islands, Annual Repons, 1973; 1974) . Workers who participated in this felt the lack of power.
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It was a period in which the value of wagẽs fell in relation to price increases, there was a chronic shortage of housing (marked by a rise in the number of squatter settlements, some of them fmmed by : married govẽmment employees), workers received few extra allowances or benefits and many grievances were ignored.
Wary of attempts to revive unionism~ the government, in 1973, produced its own guidelines. These were little more than 'thinly disguised joint consultation and continued to ret1ect the colonial approach to containment. Unions should not try and organise nationally but remain small, confined to one trade or profession, and remain non-political. They should elect their own leaders and avoid full-time officials. Workers' Union which later became the Gove1nment Non-Established Workers' Union (GNEWU), the Guadalcanal Plains General Workers' Union (GPLGWU), and the Solomon Islands Public Servants Association (SIPSA), fo1u1ed out of the old BSICSA (Solomon Islands, AMual Report, 1975) .
The initiative for a new and mote independent kind of unionism started in early 1975. Rather unpredictably it came from outside the workforce and outside the government~ from an economics graduate of the University of Papua New Guinea, Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, who was one of the few university graduates at that time to return to the Solomons and forgo automatic entry into the public service. He was joined by Joses Tuhanuku who also had teitiary ttaining in Papua New Guinea at the Lae University of Technology. They originally met through their involvement in student politics in Papua New Guinea, an experience which had a strong influence on their approach to unionism. They fo1 tned the Solomon Islands General Workers' Union (SIGWU), later to becoruc · the Solomon Islands National Union of Workers (SINUW). By working full-time for the union, organising nationally across all indusuies and sectors, being willing to use militant tactics and adopt political objectives, their aims and methods represented a complete break with government policy.
Ulufa'alu and Tuhanuku staned off by organising for six months in the labour lines and at public meetings. This helped to lay the basis for subsequent solidarity action when they eventually sought recognition for the union. Ulufa 'alu concentrated in particular on his relatives (wantoks) from the Langa I .anga and West Kwaio area of Malaita, people with long experience of labour migration and industrial action.
The SIGWU had its greatest impact between July 1975 and February 1976. The pc1iod started off with a dispute over recognition when the union set out to represent stevedores working for the Pons Authority. Known as a tough ẽmployer more inclined to replace its labour in the event of disag~eements rather than negotiate, the Authority delayed recognition and negotiations. The stevedores struck and after one week they were joined by more than 1 ,300 other workers in Honiara in a show of solidary action. This included many essential workers which immediately threatened basic services in town and forced the government to become involved (Solomo. ns N, ews Drum, 30 August 1975) .
Attempts to resolv· e the dispute began with · the appointment of a one-man Commission of Inquiry into the cause of the stevedores' strike. The union ignored this move because it offered no assurance of any decision over their request for recognition, no protection for the stevedores or recommendations on their behalf. After · the strike had been running for two weeks, the Chief Minister in association with his Council of Ministers entered into direct negotiations with the union. Mter a week-end of negotiations it was agreed that an arbitration tribunal would be appointed to hear the stevedores' case, the stevedores would get compensation for the rime that they were off · work, specialconsideration would be given to essential workers when legal action was taken against them; and the government would assist the union in obtaining recognition from other employers (Solomons News Drwn, 5 September 1975) . When the Tribunal brought , down its findings in October, 1975 , it granted the stevedores a substantial wage inctease (20 percent for senior stevedores, 25 percent for junior stevedores) and strongly recommended changes in labour legislation and the appointment of a Labour Advisory Committee (Solomons News Drum, 31 October 1975) .
The dispute with the Ports Authority and the associated general strike gave Ulufa'alu and the SIGWU maximum publicity in Honiara and throughout the Solomons. There was a rush of interest in joining the union and in pushing for negotiations with other ẽmployers. With this advantage a more ambitious round of action started soon afterwards culminating in another much larger general strike. The main basis for this action was a mov, e to amalgamate all existing unions, with the exception of the SIPSA, into one Amalgamated National Workers' Union (ANWU), seek recognition for the new union from all medium and large employers, and confront them with a comprehensive log of claims made up of 57 political and industrial demands. ' The government tried to stop this action by refusing to register the ANWU using a clause in the constitution of the SIGWU. Ulufa'alu and other leaders of the ANWU ignored this and proceeded to ask for recognition from all , employers anyhow, demanding negotiations under threat of strike action (Solomons News Drwn, 21 November 1975; 12 December 1975) .
Simultaneously the SIGWU organised political demonstrations in Honiara. There was a protest march on 26 November and another illegal march on 11 December. After the second march, six union officials were arrested as leaders of an illegal protest and later fined. Two who refused to pay their fines, Ulufa'alu and James Maefa'alu (President of the GNEWU) were subsequently sent to prison. There was another big demonstration on the day of internal self-government, 2 January, 1976 (Solomons News Drum, 5 Deoember 1975 19 December 1975; 9 January 1976; Tuhanuku, 1983, pp.l22-123) .
The day of self government was also when the threatened general strike began. At the start, 4,300 workers stayed away from work, representing 70 to 80 per cent of workers employed in Honiara and on the Guadalcanal Plains. The strength of support here shows the kind of impact made by the SIGWU in the six months which it had been operating. For the government, this and the continuing political agitation brought a crisis of strange proportions: a generalised dispute over Jiecognition directed at a largẽ number of employers, accompanied by a complex log of claims with 57 items representing both political and industrial demands, carried out in the name of an unregistered union, whose leader was in prison. Such a dispute could not be ignored, yet fitted none of the available conciliation procedures. It forced the government to intervene ẽven more than it had done previously. Their action in this case fmally halted moves to amalgamate existing unions, but it did ensure that individual unions, including the SIGWU, got recognition from a large number of the employers originally targeted by them and, in many cases, ẽnded up negotiating collectivẽ agreements with them. Government streamlined the log of claims by ignoring all the political demands and reducing it to 28 industrial items. Some agreements were reached in the first week of the strike. By 12 January more than half the striking workers had returned to work. More agreements in the second week of the strike meant that most workers then returned to work. By late January, Ulufa,alu was claiming to have completed talks and negotiated agreements with 22 companies with more negotiations still proceeding (Salomons News Drum, 9 January 1976; 16 January 1976; 27 February 1976) .
The ev, ents of 1975-76 had precedents in the large Honiara strikes of 1962 and 1965. Again there was gẽneralised support from large numbers of public and private sector workers . . Again. , civil servants rẽfused to join. The 1976 strike was the last time that general strikẽ action would take place. . There has been frequent militant action since then but it has been confined to single industries or companies, or to single pro~essional groups like the teachers and civil servants. The reasons for this can be found in changes which were made in industrial legislation in 1976 introducing compulsory arbitration and penalties for 'unlawful' strikes (Trade Disputes Act 1976); and changes in the tactics adoptẽd by trade unions, being . more selective with sympathy strike action. At one level, the 1975-76 action shows the frustration that had built up among workers unable to negotiate , effectively over working conditions and not having leaders who were a match for the bosses and bureaucrats of Honiara. At another level, these events mark a decisive break with the past, with the failures of the 1960s and with the constraining influence of colonial control. It was as if unionism went through its own transition to independence immediately before the rest of the country.
Unionism and the post-colonial state
The events of 1975 and early 1976, bad a profound influence on the future developtnent of the union movement and on Solomon Islands industrial relations. The SIGWU went on from this to become the largest union in the country, with the strength and commitment to bring about a steady improvement in working conditions for a wide range of employees in many different industries and workplaces (Keith-Reid, 1983) . It also went on to fotrn a political pany, the Nationalists' Pany, later to become the National Democratic Pany (NDP) For the SIGWU, the frrst venture into politics was nearly disastrous. The temporary suspension of the union in late 1977 under allegations of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds, and its loss of credibility and effectiveness, has been described by Tuhanuku (1983, pp.l27-128) . He returned earlier than he intended from training in Denmark and set about rebuilding the union starting among plantation workers. By securing some good agreements with major companiest he succeeded in putting the union back on its feet. While Tuhanuku , credits plantation workers for ensuring the recovery of the union it was urban workers who were to get the greatest benefit from collective negotiations, especially government non-established workers. SIGWU support for these In this fegard, the SIGWU/SINUW fought on a wide front, not just acting on behalf of more privileged sectors of the labour force like non-established workers, but taking on small and large · Companies throughout the private sector. It also fought for the non-unionised as well as the unionised by arguing for a higher minimum wage. . The SINUW led the way in seeking affiliation with international trade union organisations. In 1980 it obtained full membership of the International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFfU) (Tuhanuku, 1983, p.l29 ). There were nips to Moscow and meetings of the WFrU by Tuhanuku, Ulufa'alu and other officials (Tuhanuku, 1983; News Drum, 29 May 1981) . The SINUW also played a role in the development of regional trade union links, attending meetings of the Pacific Trade Union Conference, later to become the Pacific Trade Union Forum and then the Pacific Trade Union Community. Tuhanuku was extremely active in the fight for a nuclear-free Pacific and in attacks on colonialism (Robie, 1986) .
As the SINUW increased in strength and effectiveness there were renewed attacks on it and on unionism generally. The strongest attacks came from ,government, concerned that it was losing the battle to hold down wages. In pursuing that battle, the government relied mainly on labour legislation as the best way in which to contain collective bargaining. This included the law relating to trade unions, introduced in 1966 and · Iieinforc.ed by successive amendments, and the law relating to essential services, which was gradually extended to include a wider range of services.
The law that has had the grearest impact on industrial relations in the 1980s has beẽn the ' Trade Disputes Act 1981 (which replaced the Trade Disputes Act 1976). Originally based on the Fiji Trade Disputẽs Act 1973, the main change that this brought about was to intnxiuce compulsory arbitration. The int· ention was to limit the impact of industrial disputes and speed up conciliation and arbitration procedures (News Drum, 10 Apri11981). The 1981 Act took this further by setting up a Trade Disputes Panel made up of a Chairman appointed by the Judicial and Legal Service Commission, and an equal number of union representatives and employer representatives. The requirement that its decisions must ~e account of 'the economy as a whole' allows for considerable flexibility in interpretation. The Act makes it very easy for disputes to be refetted to the Panel and consequently it has come to be used by · employers as a way for avoiding serious negotiations. The number of cases being referred to the Panel has steadily increased (The Nius, 7 August 1987).
The SINUW opposed the Trade Disputes . Act when it was introduced in 1981 and was highly critical of the Trade Disputes Panel as soon as it began operating (N. ews Drum, 27 November 1981; Government Monthly, June 1985) . Tuhanuku accused it of favouring employers. To the extent that it was able to restrict wage increases his criticisms are well-founded. Early on in its deliberations the Panel put forward the principle that it would be wrong to calculate wages by reference to womers' doniiCstic needs alone, disregarding the type of work (News Drum, 18 December 1981) . With this kind of principle it had no trouble acting as a brake on · wage increases. Adjusting wage demands according to the ability of businesses to pay allowed it to withstand SINUW's fight to reduce wage disparities between industries and enterprises (Keith-Reid, 1983 (Government Monthly, November 1984) . Since then it has ~egularly pursued major wage increases for civil servants. The SINT A grew out of earlier unsucoessful anempts to fonn a national teachers' union (Galo and Pelobule, 1986, p.14) . ~eachers had previously tried to join the SINUW but were thwaned by the law preventing government employees from joining non-governmental unions. Besides pursuing regular wage increases, the union took as one of its central issues the fight to restructure teachers' pay in line with that of the public service.
Of the two large public sector unions, civil servants have pursued the more independent line within the union movement. They have been prepared ' tO work in with other public sector unions but have been more cautious about cooperating with the SINUW. One of the main differences between them has been disag~eement ovẽr international affiliation. The SIPEU opposed the SJNUW's affiliation with the WFfU, not so much for ideological reasons than because it objected to any kind of manipulation by international organisations (Waghorne, cited by Leckie, forthcoming). Whether or not SINUW was being manipulated, and this is doubtful, such a stand did not prevent SIPEU from seeking its own international suppon from organisations ~e the Asia American Ftee Labour Institute (AAFLI), Public Service International (PSI) and Postal Telegraph and 'elephone Intẽmational (Pl*l'l) (Solomon Nius, 29 May 1987; 6 May 1988) .
This division between the SINUW and the SIPEU was brought on more by rivalry between their respective officials than deeply held ideological differences. . Yet it has not prevented cooperation in areas of mutual interest, notably in the most recent dispute with government over the new contracts for Permanent Secretaries.
What is particularly significant about contemporary unionism under the influence of the three largest unions is their strong involvement in politics. SJNUW made another attempt to unify the union movement and fo1m a political party soon after the demise of the National Democratic Party. In 1986 a large number of unions joined to fotm the Solomon Islands Council of Trade Unions (SICIU). One of the fli'St actions of the Council was to boycott a government-proposed Economic Summit at which it was intended to discuss a wage freeze and public service redundancies (Solomon Nius, 4 September 1986) . Not long after the SICI1J was fo1n1ed it procẽeded to organise the Solomon Islands Labour Party in time to contest the 1989 general elections. The Labour Party manifesto offer-ed much more for trade unions than any previous political party, including promises to see disputes settled through negotiations and to replace the Trade Dispute Panel with a tripartite Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (Solomon Islands Labour Party, M, anifesto, 1988) . Tuhanuku became the frrst President of the Labour Party and was one of two candidates to win seats in the National Parliament. He has now become Leader of the Opposition. Given the present instability of parliamentary politics, the Labour Party could become part of a coalition government but even that prospect would still be a long way from a Labour govẽmment.
The record of union involvement in politics only shows that they are unable to muster much political support outside the very small number of constituencies in which workers are , concentrated. Only a smaJI number of unionists have won seats by standing in their home area and the union movement still has to fmd some other way of expanding its political base.
Political activity has not been resaicted to election campaigns and parliamentary politics. In many other ways unions have represented one of the strongest countervailing forces in national politics through the 1980s. Much of their action has been directed at governments of the day, sometimes on the basis of poor perfot.rnance, especially poor economic management, sometimes over specific issues. A lot of this action can be summed up as protest against the accumulation of power and the abuse of power by politicians and bureaucrats. The SINUW led a march of 2000 unionists in Honiara in 1981 soon after the Kenilorea government voted in new sahuy increases for members of parliament (News Drum, 8 May 1981 Notwithstanding these and other protests, the concentration of power in the post-colonial state has proceeded Because of its large size and its pivotal role in the national economy the state became what Sandbrook (1985, p.67) describes as the ••principle instrument of personal advancement". Those who came to power at independence took over colonial , economic policy and then became the main beneficiaries of it. ' The people to benefit from these opportunities were at the highest levels of the state structure -cabinet ministers, top civil servants, constitutional post holders, executivẽ officers, managers and directors of public agencies and public enterprises. Advancement to these positions began in the eaily 1970s in the lead-up to independence. It speeded up as localisation proceeded and the state continued to expand. Besides the obvious advantage of higher salaries, special allowances, access to the best government housing and vehicles, and numerous other perks, these political insiders have been able to use their power in other ways to augment their earnings and control of assets. Many top politicians and bureaucrats have gone on to become · wealthy businessmen and landlords in Honiara.
This process of dominant class fo1mation through the auspices of the state, is now well advanced. It must be kept in mind that class relations in this situation "are deternlined by relations of power, not production" (Sklar, 1979, p.537) . It is not that a pre-existing ruling class seized the opportunity for local accumulation at independence; rather a political elite has used its power to pursue economic prosperity (Sandbrook, 1985, p.68) . It is now well on the way towards becoming a ruling class. As this paper has shown, class fot.rnation in Solomon Islands has not been confined to a new dominant class; new subordinate classes are emerging as well, including in particular an urban based working class. Both dominant and subordinate classes are still very weak because of the shon history of economic and political change, because of the fluidity of present power relations and because ethnic and regional divisions are still very strong.
Trade unions have, on occasions, provided a useful political base for movement into the elite as happened with the SIPSA, with the SIPEU, and with the SINUW.. More imponantly, trade unions, are a good indication of the level of solidarity within the new working class, and its capacity for organisation and collective action. They are also an important indication of the way in which class sttuggle has developed. A lot of the union action which has been described can be intetptcted in general te1ms as protest against the newly emerging dominant class. The fact that unions have not simply restricted themselves to fighting for basic industrial concerns shows that they have a good understanding of the new relations of power within which they are situated.
Conclusion
The history of unionism in Solomon Islands spans the crea· tion of a larger, more stable and more concentrated workforce. By rejecting the colonial model of industrial relations a distinctive fotm of unionism was established, sufficiently professional and autonomous to ensure effective collective negotiations and also ensure it would survive and grow in strength. The exceptionally high level of union membership and the high level of cooperation between different unions means that unionism has become a powerful political force in relation to the post-colonial state.
Unions have won many industrial battles through the 1980s. They have also found other ways of providing benefits for their members and strengthening their membership. This includes setting up crerlit unions, providing health insurance and starting superannuation schemes. Politically they have not succeeded in preventing the inc1easing accumulation of power by a new political elite. The danger is that as trade unions continue their effons to do this, they will find that power being used more severely against them. There are signs of this already with the withdrawal of recognition from the SIPEU in 1991. This suggests that the political battles in which unions are now engaged could become more intense and threatening to them, particular if the state becomes incteasingly authoritarian.
